Damning final report into Grenfell disaster finds ‘systemic dishonesty’ and ‘decades of failure’ caused deadly inferno
4 September 2024, 11:02 | Updated: 4 September 2024, 13:15
The Grenfell Tower fire was a “culmination of decades of failure” by the government and members of the construction industry, the final report into the disaster has found.
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The long-awaited conclusion of the inquiry has found there was a “complacent and defensive attitude to fire safety” within Government, with ministers repeatedly failing to act on warnings about the dangers of the flammable cladding.
72 people were killed in the fire in London’s North Kensington in June 2017.
The inquiry found that organisations who made and sold the products, used on Grenfell Tower, were “deliberately dishonest”, with one firm - Celotex - said to have manipulated a test on its insulation to “mislead the market”.
Another company - Arconic Architectural Products - which was responsible for manufacturing the cladding panels, was found to have been “determined to exploit weak regulation in the UK” despite recognising the danger they posed.
Responding to the inquiry, Arconic said it was its subsidiary, Arconic Architectural Products SAS (AAP), which had supplied the material used for cladding in the tower's refurbishment, and that it rejects "any claim that AAP sold an unsafe product" and "did not conceal information from or mislead any certification body, customer, or the public".
Grenfell Tower Inquiry chairman Sir Martin Moore-Bick said the deaths of 72 people in the 2017 fire were "all avoidable".
He said today: "The simple truth is that the deaths that occurred were all avoidable and that those who lived in the tower were badly failed over a number of years and in a number of different ways by those who were responsible for ensuring the safety of the building and its occupants.
"They include the Government, the tenant management organisation, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, those who manufactured and supplied the materials used in the refurbishment, those who certified their suitability for use on high-rise residential buildings, the architect, Studio E; the principal contractor, Rydon Maintenance Ltd, and some of its sub-contractors, in particular, Harley Curtain Wall Ltd and its successor Harley Facades Ltd; some of the consultants, in particular the fire engineer, Exova Warringtonfire Ltd; the local authority's building control department and the London Fire Brigade.
"Not all of them bear the same degree of responsibility for the eventual disaster, but, as our reports show, all contributed to it in one way or another, in most cases through incompetence but in some cases through dishonesty and greed.
"The failings can be traced back over many years and our efforts to get to the bottom of what went wrong and why, account for the length of our report and the time it has taken us to produce it."
The inquiry panel says the government was repeatedly told of the dangers of combustible cladding, including a stark warning in 1999 that “it should not take a serious fire in which people were killed” before it acted.
The report says the then Department for Communities and Local Government was poorly run, with a relatively junior official given day to day responsibility for building regulations.
It claims he “did not satisfy himself that his response to matters affecting the safety of people’s lives was appropriate”.
It also criticised the deregulation agenda of the post-2010 government, concluding that officials didn’t fully understand the process for seeking an exemption from it, including when it came to public safety, despite a fatal fire at Lakanal House in Camberwell, in 2009.
The report says: “The government’s de-regulatory agenda dominated the department’s thinking so much that matters affecting the safety of life were ignored, delayed or disregarded.”
The report concluded that the government “determinedly resisted” calls from across the fire sector for regulation around fire risks.
The report also places blame on several private firms responsible for the manufacturing and installation of the fatal cladding on Grenfell Tower:
- Rydon, the principal contractor for the block’s refurbishment, was found to have had a “casual attitude to fire safety” and an inexperienced team. The inquiry said the firm should “bear considerable responsibility” for the fire.
- Arconic Architectural Products, who sold the cladding panels, were found to have deliberately concealed the extent of the materials’ danger, particularly on high rise buildings, but were “determined to exploit weak regulation” in the UK and other countries.
- Celotex, which sold the insulation used in the cladding, were found to have rigged a safety test of the material to make sure it would pass. It then proceeded to market the insulation as the ‘first’ to ‘successfully’ pass the test, even though it had been manipulated.
- Studio E, the architect employed for the refurbishment, was found to bear “very significant responsibility” for the disaster due to its “cavalier attitude to fire safety regulations”. The inquiry suggests the building material was chosen because it was cheap.
- Harley, a cladding subcontractor, was also said to bear a significant degree of responsibility, with the panel finding the firm “appears to have thought there was no need to consider fire safety because others would do so”.
- TMO, The TMO's failure to attach sufficient importance to fire safety was "illustrated by its reliance on a single person."
Labour MP wants 'swift implementation' of Grenfell Inquiry recommendations
The inquiry’s final report dedicates an entire volume to the 72 people who died in Grenfell Tower on 14th June 2017, detailing the conditions on each floor of the 24-storey block.
Grenfell survivors and bereaved families have called for criminal charges to be brought against the people responsible for the fire.
The Metropolitan Police says a total of 19 organisations and 58 people are being treated as suspects in its investigation.
Amongst the report’s key recommendations, it said:
- Government should bring responsibility for fire safety into one department under one Secretary of State. Currently, this is split between the Home Office, the Department for Housing, Communities and Local Government, and the Department for Business and Trade.
- The creation of the government role of Chief Construction Advisor, appointed by the Secretary of State.
- A statutory requirement for a Fire Safety Strategy to be produced by a registered fire engineer, for the construction or refurbishment of any higher-risk building. This would need to be reviewed and resubmitted on competition and take into account the needs of vulnerable people.
- The government should take urgent steps to recognise and protect the profession of ‘Fire Engineer’ by law and increase the number of places on high level masters courses in fire engineering. The report said it is currently possible for anyone to practise as a fire engineer without proper qualifications.
- A new licensing scheme for contractors.
The government announced on Monday that personal evacuation plans for disabled residents in high rise blocks will be introduced, as recommended in the inquiry’s Phase One report in 2019.
15 of the 72 victims of the Grenfell fire were disabled.
